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We consider a participatory budgeting problem in which each voter submits a proposal for how to divide a
single divisible resource (such as money or time) among several possible alternatives (such as public projects or
activities) and these proposals must be aggregated into a single aggregate division. Under ℓ1 preferences—for
which a voter’s disutility is given by the ℓ1 distance between the aggregate division and the division he or she
most prefers—the social welfare-maximizing mechanism, which minimizes the average ℓ1 distance between
the outcome and each voter’s proposal, is incentive compatible [21]. However, it fails to satisfy the natural
fairness notion of proportionality, placing too much weight on majority preferences. Leveraging a connection
between market prices and the generalized median rules of Moulin [26], we introduce the independent markets
mechanism, which is both incentive compatible and proportional. We unify the social welfare-maximizing
mechanism and the independent markets mechanism by defining a broad class ofmoving phantommechanisms
that includes both. We show that every moving phantom mechanism is incentive compatible. Finally, we
characterize the social welfare-maximizing mechanism as the unique Pareto-optimal mechanism in this class,
suggesting an inherent tradeoff between Pareto optimality and proportionality.
1 INTRODUCTION
Participatory budgeting gives members of a community power by allowing them to collectively
decide how to divide a portion of the community’s budget among a set of proposed alternatives [10].
While participatory budgeting was first introduced in Brazil [30], it has now been used in more than
3,000 cities around the world, including New York, Boston, Chicago, San Francisco, and Toronto [27].
It has been used to determine how to allocate the budgets of states and cities as well as housing
authorities and schools.
Many participatory budgeting elections are run using a variant of k-approval voting, in which
each voter chooses up tok projects to approve, and the projects with the highest number of approvals
are funded, subject to budget constraints [21]. Under such a voting scheme, each proposed project
is either fully funded or not funded at all. This makes sense for well-delineated projects such as
renovating a school or adding an elevator to a public library. For other kinds of projects, funding
decisions need not be all-or-nothing. For example, participatory budgeting could be used to decide
how to divide a city’s tax surplus between its departments of health, education, infrastructure, and
parks. A voter might propose a division of the tax surplus among the four departments into the
fractions (30%, 40%, 20%, 10%). The city could invite each citizen to submit such a budget proposal,
and they could then be aggregated by a suitable mechanism.
A first idea for aggregating the proposals would be to take the mean. But the mean has a serious
flaw as an aggregator: it’s easily manipulated. A voter preferring a (60%, 40%) division across two
alternatives may vote (100%, 0%) instead in order to distort the mean calculation and move the
aggregate closer to his or her true preference if the first alternative has little community support.
In this paper, we seek mechanisms that are resistant to such manipulation. In particular, we
require that no voter can, by lying, move the aggregate division toward his or her preference on
one alternative without moving it away from his or her preference by an equal or greater amount
on other alternatives. In other words, we seek budget aggregation mechanisms that are incentive
compatible under ℓ1 preferences, with each voter’s disutility for a budget division equal to the ℓ1
distance between that division and the division she prefers most.
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Goel et al. [21] showed that choosing an aggregate budget division that maximizes the welfare of
the voters—that is, a division that minimizes the total ℓ1 distance from each voter’s report—is both
incentive compatible and Pareto-optimal under this voter utility model. However, this utilitarian
aggregate has a tendency to overweight majority preferences, creeping back towards all-or-nothing
allocations. For example, imagine that a hundred voters prefer (100%, 0%) while ninety-nine prefer
(0%, 100%). The utilitarian aggregate is (100%, 0%) even though the mean is close to (50%, 50%). In
many participatory budgeting scenarios, the latter solution is more in the spirit of consensus. For
example, imagine that each family votes for all education dollars to go to their own neighborhood
school. The utilitarian aggregate would earmark the entire budget to the most populous school
district, while we may prefer that funds are split in proportion to the districts’ populations. To
capture this fairness constraint, we define a notion of proportionality, requiring that when voters
are single-minded (as in this example), the fraction of the budget assigned to each alternative is
equal to the proportion of voters who favor that alternative. Do there exist aggregators that are
both incentive compatible and proportional?
For the special case of two alternatives, ℓ1 preferences are a special-case of single-peaked prefer-
ences, well studied in the voting literature. The seminal results of Moulin [26] imply that, in this
setting, all incentive compatible voting schemes correspond to inserting n + 1 “phantom” proposals,
where n is the number of voters, and returning the median of the n true proposals and the n + 1
phantoms. We show that there exists a way of placing the phantoms that results in a proportional
mechanism for two alternatives.
Generalizing Moulin’s phantom median mechanisms to allow for more than two alternatives is
difficult. Existing proposals for such generalizations take a median in each dimension independently
[5, 9, 28], but this strategy is doomed in our application with normalization constraints; unlike the
mean, taking a coordinate-wise median will by default fail to normalize. We address this problem by
allowing the set of phantoms to continuously shift upwards, increasing the sum of the generalized
medians until the aggregate becomes normalized. This idea allows us to define a very general
class of moving phantom mechanisms. Although one might think that allowing the final phantom
locations to depend on voters’ reports might give voters an incentive to misreport, we prove that
every moving phantom mechanism is incentive compatible under ℓ1 preferences.
Among this large family of incentive compatible mechanisms, we find one that satisfies our
proportionality requirement. This moving phantom mechanism is obtained when phantoms are
placed uniformly between 0 and a value x ≥ 0 which increases until the coordinate-wise medians
sum to one. To analyze this mechanism, we prove that the aggregate found by this mechanism
can be interpreted as the clearing prices in a market system, and hence call it the independent
markets mechanism. This reveals an unexpected connection between market prices and generalized
medians that may be of broader interest. The independent markets mechanism can also be justified
from a game-theoretic perspective as the unique Nash equilibrium of a natural voting game. Thus,
this proportional moving phantom mechanism has two alternative interpretations:
(1) Market interpretation: For each alternative, we set up a market in which x units of a divisible
good are sold. This amount x is the same across all markets. Each voter has a value for the
good in market j that is equal to the fraction of the budget that the voter would prefer be
allocated to alternative j in the budget division setting, and has $1 to spend in each market.
Increase x until the point at which the market clearing prices across these independent
markets sum to $1. At this point, the market clearing prices are exactly the aggregate division
output by the independent markets moving phantom mechanism.
(2) Voting game: Each agent receives one credit for each alternative and may choose any amount
of that credit to spend on the alternative. The outcome of the game is a normalized vector
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proportional to the amount spent on each alternative. Agents choose their spending in such
a way as to minimize the ℓ1 distance between their preferred division in the budget division
setting and the vector output by the game. The Nash equilibrium of this game is exactly the
aggregate division output by the independent markets mechanism.
By analyzing the market and Nash equilibria of these systems, we can show that our mechanism
satisfies several important social choice properties.
In contrast, the independent markets mechanism unfortunately fails to satisfy Pareto optimality.
We show that this is unavoidable, as no proportional moving phantommechanism is Pareto-optimal.
In fact, we prove that there is a unique moving phantom mechanism that is. In this mechanism, all
phantoms start at 0 and then, one by one, transition to 1, with no two phantoms moving at the
same time. This mechanism turns out to also have a phantom-free interpretation: it is equivalent to
selecting the maximum-entropy budget division out of all those that maximize social welfare—the
same mechanism studied by Goel et al. [21] up to the choice of tie-breaking rules.
While the motivation of our formal model is participatory budgeting, it applies to the division
of other resources such as time. For example, one might imagine using such a mechanism as a
way to reach consensus among a team of conference organizers who wish to divide a day between
talks, poster sessions, and social activities. Another example would be a government that needs to
decide on a target energy mix (that is, how much energy should come from fossil fuels, nuclear, or
renewable sources) and wishes to aggregate expert proposals. In all these applications, our class of
moving phantom mechanisms can be used to make better decisions.
Related Work. Several recent papers study voting rules for participatory budgeting, considering
both axiomatics and computational complexity, but under the assumption that indivisible projects
can either be fully funded or not funded at all [3, 7, 21, 24]. The setting in which partial funding of
alternatives is permitted has also been studied, but generally under a different utility model in which
voters assign utility scores to the alternatives rather than having an ideal distribution [2, 8, 16].
This body of work includes positive results for weak versions of incentive compatibility, but
impossibilities for obtaining full incentive compatibility. Garg et al. [19] perform a Mechanical
Turk study exploring preference structure in a high-dimensional continuous setting similar to ours.
Closest to our work is that of Goel et al. [21]. The primary focus of their paper is on knapsack
voting, in which each voter submits her preferred set of projects to fully fund. However, they also
consider the use of fractional knapsack voting in a setting in which partial funding of alternatives is
permitted and voters have ℓ1 preferences. This corresponds exactly to our setting. They show that
the mechanism that maximizes social welfare (with some fixed tie-breaking) is incentive compatible.
We replicate this result by showing that the welfare-maximizing mechanism (with an arguably
more natural way to break ties) is a member of the large class of moving phantom mechanisms, all
of which are incentive compatible. Goel et al. do not consider other mechanisms for this setting.
The truthful aggregation of preferences over numerical values (such as the temperature for
an office) has been extensively studied. A famous result of Moulin [26] characterizes the set of
incentive compatible voting rules under the assumption that voters have single-peaked preferences
over values in [0, 1]. These voting rules are generalized median schemes. The best-known example
is the standard median, in which each voter reports her ideal point in [0, 1] and the median
report is selected. Other voting rules in this class insert “phantom voters” who report a fixed
top choice. Barberà et al. [4] obtained a multi-dimensional analogue of this result for [0, 1]m , and
there are further generalizations that characterize truthful rules if other constraints are imposed
on the feasible set [6]. Crucially, the constraints allowed by Barberà et al. [6] do not include
the normalization constraint that is fundamental to our setting. Several other papers [5, 9, 28]
introduced multidimensional models in which one can achieve truthfulness by taking a generalized
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median in each coordinate, but such a strategy does not work with normalization constraints. We
are not aware of results (prior to this work) that extend generalized medians to multiple dimensions
without using a mechanism that decomposes into one-dimensional mechanisms.
In the computer science literature, the above-mentioned generalized median schemes have
also been studied in the context of truthful facility location [1, 29]. In this context, the aim is to
approximate social welfare subject to incentive compatibility.
One could apply our results to the aggregation of probabilistic beliefs. There is a large literature
on probabilistic opinion pooling [12, 17, 20, 23] which studies aggregators in this context. The
main focus of that literature is to preserve stochastic and epistemic properties. To the best of our
knowledge, strategic aspects have not been considered.
Finally, recently proposed rules for crowdsourcing societal tradeoffs [13, 14] can also be used to
aggregate budget divisions (with full support) after converting them into pairwise ratios of funding
amounts, but this setting has also not been analyzed from a strategic viewpoint.
2 PRELIMINARIES
Let N = {1, . . . ,n} be a set of voters andM = {1, . . . ,m} be a set of possible alternatives. Voters
have structured preferences over budget divisions p ∈ [0, 1]m , with ∑j ∈[m] pj = 1, where pj is the
fraction of a public resource (such as money or time) allocated to alternative j. Each voter i has
a most preferred division pi = (pi,1, . . . ,pi,m), with their preference over other divisions induced
by ℓ1 distance from pi. Specifically, each voter i has a disutility for division q equal to d(pi, q),
where d(x, y) = ∑mj=1 |xi −yi | denotes the ℓ1 distance between x and y. Note that a voter’s complete
preference over all possible divisions can be deduced from their most preferred division pi.
A preference profile P = (pˆ1, pˆ2, . . . , pˆn) consists of a reported division pˆi for each voter i . We use
P−i to denote the reports of all voters other than i . A budget aggregation mechanism A takes as
input a preference profile P, and outputs an aggregate division A(P). A mechanism is continuous
if it is continuous when considered as a function A : (Rm)n → Rm . We say that a mechanism is
anonymous if its output is fixed under permutations of the voters, and neutral if a permutation of
the alternatives in voters’ inputs permutes the output in the same way.
We are interested in mechanisms that satisfy incentive compatibility. Voters should not be able to
change the aggregate division in their favor by misrepresenting their preference.
Definition 2.1. A budget aggregation mechanism A satisfies incentive compatibility if, for all
preference profiles P, voters i , and divisions pi and pˆi, d(A(P−i , pˆi), pi) ≥ d(A(P−i, pi), pi).
We are also interested in the basic efficiency notion of Pareto optimality. It should not be possible
to change the aggregate so that some voter is strictly better off but no other voter is worse off.
Definition 2.2. A budget aggregationmechanismA satisfies Pareto optimality if, for all preference
profiles P, and all divisions q, if d(A(P), pˆi) > d(q, pˆi) for some voter i , then there exists a voter j
for which d(A(P), pˆj) < d(q, pˆj).
Observe that the definitions of incentive compatibility and Pareto optimality depend only on
the voters’ preference relations, not the exact utility model. Results pertaining to these properties
therefore hold for any utility function that induces the same ordinal preferences as linear utilities.
We also consider a fairness property that we call proportionality: Suppose each voter is single-
minded, in that they prefer a division in which the entire resource goes to a single alternative. Then
it is natural to split the resource in proportion to the number of voters supporting each alternative.
For example, if 6 voters report (1, 0, 0), 3 voters report (0, 1, 0), and 1 voter reports (0, 0, 1), then the
aggregate should be (0.6, 0.3, 0.1). We call this property proportionality.
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Definition 2.3. A voter is single-minded if their preferred division is a unit vector. A budget
aggregation mechanism A is proportional if, for every preference profile P consisting of only
single-minded voters, and every alternative j , A(P)j = nj/n, where nj is the number of voters that
support alternative j.
We note that proportionality is a fairly weak definition, only applying to a small subset of possible
profiles. However, as we will see later, it is already strong enough to be incompatible with Pareto
optimality within the class of moving phantom mechanisms that we introduce in this paper.
3 TWO ALTERNATIVES
To build intuition, we begin by considering the case in whichm = 2. Due to the normalization of
inputs and of the output, and with ℓ1 preferences, the problem is perfectly one-dimensional in this
case. This allows us to directly import Moulin’s [26] famous characterization of generalized median
rules as the only incentive compatible mechanisms for voters with single-peaked preferences over
a single-dimensional quantity.1
Theorem 3.1 ([26]). Form = 2, an anonymous and continuous budget aggregation mechanism A
is incentive compatible if and only if there are α0 ≥ α1 ≥ . . . ≥ αn in [0, 1] such that, for all profiles P,
A(P)1 = med(p1,1,p2,1, . . . ,pn,1,α0,α1, . . . ,αn),
A(P)2 = med(p1,2,p2,2, . . . ,pn,2, 1 − α0, 1 − α1, . . . , 1 − αn).
The numbers αk are known as phantoms. Each mechanism described by Theorem 3.1 can be
understood as taking the coordinate-wise median of the reported distributions, after inserting n + 1
phantom voters (whose report is fixed and independent of the input profile).
One can check that α0, . . . ,αn define a neutral mechanism if and only if the phantom placements
are symmetric, that is if and only if {α0, . . . ,αn} = {1 − α0, . . . , 1 − αn}. Note that there are n + 1
phantoms but only n voters, so that the phantoms can outweigh the voters. For example, when
αk = 1/2 for all k ∈ {0, . . . ,n} then the mechanism is just the constant mechanism returning
(1/2, 1/2). However, if we take α0 = 1 and αn = 0, then these two phantoms “cancel out” and there
are only n − 1 phantoms left. In fact, one can check that the mechanism is Pareto-optimal if and
only if α0 = 1 and αn = 0 [26].
A particularly interesting example is the uniform phantom mechanism, obtained when placing
the phantoms uniformly over the interval [0, 1], so that αk = 1 − k/n for each k ∈ {0, . . . ,n}. This
placement of phantom voters appears in a paper by Caragiannis et al. [11]. They were aiming
for mechanisms whose output is close to the mean, and they prove that the uniform phantom
mechanism yields an aggregate that is closer to the mean than that obtained from any other
phantom placements, in the worst case over inputs. The uniform phantom mechanism has other
attractive properties, including being proportional in the sense of Definition 2.3.
Proposition 3.2. Form = 2, the uniform phantom mechanism is the unique (anonymous and
continuous) budget aggregation mechanism A that is both incentive compatible and proportional.
Proof. Theorem 3.1 gives us that A is incentive compatible if and only if it can be written
in terms of phantom medians. We therefore need only to consider the additional requirement of
proportionality. The uniform phantom mechanism is proportional, because if P consists of n − k
voters reporting (1, 0) and k voters reporting (0, 1), then A(P)1 = αk = (n − k)/n, as required.
1Our preference model using ℓ1 imposes slightly more structure than just single-peakedness, namely that voters are
indifferent between points that are equidistant to their peak. However, this restriction does not enlarge the class of incentive
compatible mechanisms, at least if we impose continuity [25].
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For uniqueness, suppose α0, . . . ,αn are phantom positions that induce a proportional mechanism.
Let k ∈ {0, . . . ,n}. We show that αk = 1 − k/n. Let P be a profile consisting of only single-minded
voters with n1 = n − k voters reporting pˆi = (1, 0). Then αk is the median, and proportionality
requires that αk = n1/n = (n − k)/n = 1 − k/n. □
Another natural way to place the phantoms is one that takes the coordinate-wise median. When
n + 1 is even, this is achieved by placing half the phantoms at 0 and the other half at 1, outputting
precisely the median of the reported values on each coordinate. When n + 1 is odd, we place n/2
phantoms at 0, n/2 phantoms at 1, and we place a single phantom at 1/2 to preserve neutrality.
This mechanism outputs the point between the left and right medians that is closest to 1/2. The
resulting mechanism returns an aggregate p that minimizes the sum of distances between the
reports (p1, p2, . . . , pn) and p. We will generalize this mechanism for largerm in Section 6.
4 A CLASS OF INCENTIVE COMPATIBLE MECHANISMS FOR HIGHER DIMENSIONS
Form = 2, we have a complete picture of incentive-compatible mechanisms, thanks to Moulin’s
characterization. Form ≥ 3, it is less clear how to construct examples of incentive-compatible
mechanisms. One could try to take a generalized median in each alternative independently, but the
result of such a mechanism would not respect the normalization constraint.
However, there is a way of extending the idea of generalized medians to the higher-dimensional
setting. The basic idea is that if a coordinate-wise generalized median violates the normalization
constraint, then we can adjust the placement of the phantoms, increasing or decreasing the sum of
the generalized medians as needed. Such a procedure might, in principle, give voters incentives
to manipulate in order to affect the phantom placements. However, our class of moving phantom
mechanisms manages to avoid this problem.
Definition 4.1. Let F = { fk : k ∈ {0, . . . ,n}} be a family of functions, or phantom system, where
fk : [0, 1] → [0, 1] is a continuous, weakly increasing function with fk (0) = 0 and fk (1) = 1 for each
k , and we have f0(t) ≥ f1(t) ≥ · · · ≥ fn(t) for all t ∈ [0, 1]. Then, the moving phantom mechanism
AF is defined so that for all profiles P and all j ∈ [m],
AF(P)j = med(f0(t∗), . . . , fn(t∗), pˆ1, j , . . . , pˆn, j ), (1)
where t∗ is chosen so that t∗ ∈ {t : ∑j ∈[m] med(f0(t), . . . , fn(t), pˆ1, j , . . . , pˆn, j ) = 1}.
For brevity, wewrite F (t) = (f0(t), . . . , fn(t)) and abbreviate themedian in (1) tomed(F (t), Pi ∈[n], j ).
Let us examine the definition. Each fk represents a phantom, and the phantom system F
represents a “movie” in which all phantoms continuously increase from 0 to 1, with the function
argument t defining an instantaneous snapshot of the phantom positions. The moving phantom
mechanism AF defined by F identifies a particular snapshot in time, t∗, for which the sum of
generalized medians over all coordinates is exactly 1. One can check that at least one such t∗ exists,
and that the output of the mechanism is independent of which of these t∗ is chosen.
Proposition 4.2. The moving phantom mechanism AF is well-defined for every phantom system
F satisfying the conditions of Definition 4.1.
Proof. First note that the function t 7→ ∑j ∈[m] med(F (t), Pi ∈[n], j ) is continuous and increasing
in t , because fk is continuous and increasing, and these properties are preserved under taking
the median and sum. This implies that, provided the set {t : ∑j ∈[m] med(F (t), Pi ∈[n], j ) = 1} is
non-empty, the aggregate AF(P) does not depend on the choice of t∗.
When t = 0,
∑
j ∈[m] med(F (t), Pi ∈[n], j ) = 0, since all n + 1 phantom entries are 0. When t = 1,∑
j ∈[m] med(F (t), Pi ∈[n], j ) =m > 1, since all n+ 1 phantom entries are 1. By the Intermediate Value
Theorem, using continuity, there exists t ∈ [0, 1] with ∑j ∈[m] med(F (t), Pi ∈[n], j ) = 1. □
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Fig. 1. A moving phantom mechanism operating on an instance with n = 4 andm = 3.
To build intuition, we consider an example moving phantom mechanism in Figure 1. There are
three alternatives, each occupying a column on the horizontal axis, and four voters. Voter reports
are indicated by gray horizontal line segments, with their magnitude pˆi, j indicated by their vertical
position. The phantom placements are indicated by the red lines and labeled f0, . . . , f4. For each
alternative, the median of the four agent reports and the five phantoms is indicated by a rectangle.
The four snapshots shown in Figure 1 display increasing values of t . Observe that the position
of each phantom (weakly) increases from left to right, as does the median on each alternative.
Although the vertical axis is not labeled, for simplicity of presentation, normalization here occurs
in the second image from the left. In the leftmost image, the sum of the highlighted entries is less
than 1, while in the two rightmost images it is more than 1.
For simplicity, the definition of moving phantom mechanisms treats the number of voters n as
fixed. To allow n to vary, it is necessary to define a family of phantom systems, one for each n.
In the next two sections, we give two examples of such families, but for this section we keep the
presentation simple by considering only a fixed n.
Moving phantom mechanisms satisfy some important basic properties. They are all anonymous
and neutral. Here neutrality is a design choice—one could imagine defining moving phantom
mechanisms for which the movement of the phantoms depends on the alternative. All moving
phantom mechanisms are also, again by design, continuous.
Given a profile, we can efficiently approximate the output of a moving phantom mechanism,
assuming oracle access to its defining functions F , by performing a binary search on t . In principle,
the precise time t∗ ∈ [0, 1] at which the output of the mechanism is normalized may have many
decimal digits, and for badly-behaved F it may even be irrational. For the same reason, the
mechanism may return an irrational division, so the precise computation of the output may not be
possible. However, for the mechanisms studied in the following sections, we can show that t∗ has
few digits and the output is always rational, so polynomial-time computation is possible.
We now show our main result in this section, that every moving phantommechanism is incentive
compatible. Before proving the result formally, we provide some intuition. If i changes her report
from pi to pˆi, the effect on the aggregate can be decomposed into two parts. First, we can think
of holding the phantoms fixed at the snapshot dictated by the truthful instance, while changing
i’s report to pˆi. Second, we can think of repositioning the phantoms to the snapshot required to
guarantee normalization of the aggregate vector after i reports pˆi. To prove incentive compatibility,
we show that any change that the aggregate division undergoes in the first stage can only be bad
for voter i , pushing the aggregate away from pi. Change in the second stage can push the aggregate
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towards pi, helping voter i , but the magnitude of this change is upper bounded by the magnitude
of the harmful change in the first stage.
Theorem 4.3. Every moving phantom mechanism is incentive compatible.
Proof. Let F define a moving phantom mechanism AF . Consider some report pˆi , pi, and fix
the reports of all other voters P−i. Let t∗ determine the phantom placement for reports (pi, P−i) and
tˆ∗ for reports (pˆi, P−i).
Consider the effect of i’s misreport from pi to pˆi while holding the phantom placement fixed at
F (t∗). Then, because phantom placements are fixed on each alternative, any change that voter i
can cause on alternative j by misreporting must be away from her preference pi, j . For each j ∈ [m],
• if pi, j ≤ Af (pi, P−i)j < pˆi, j , then we must have med(F (t∗), pˆi, j , P−i, j ) ≥ med(F (t∗),pi, j , P−i, j );
• if pˆi, j ≤ Af (pi, P−i)j < pi, j , then we must have med(F (t∗), pˆi, j , P−i, j ) ≤ med(F (t∗),pi, j , P−i, j );
• if pˆi, j andpi, j lie on the same side ofAf (pi, P−i)j , thenmed(F (t∗), pˆi, j , P−i, j ) = med(F (t∗),pi, j , P−i, j ).
Let yj = med(F (t∗), pˆi, j , P−i, j )−med(F (t∗),pi, j , P−i, j ) denote the change caused on alternative j
by voter i’s misreport, subject to holding the phantom placement fixed at F (t∗). By the above, the
ℓ1 distance from i’s preferred division has increased by
∑
j ∈[m] |yj | as a result of i’s misreport.
Next, we consider the change that results from moving the phantoms from F (t∗) to F (tˆ∗).
Assume that
∑
j ∈[m] yj ≥ 0 (otherwise, a very similar argument applies). Then we have that∑
j ∈[m] med(F (t∗), pˆi, j , P−i, j ) ≥ 1, which implies that tˆ∗ ≤ t∗ since the sum is monotonic in t (see
the proof of Proposition 4.2). This produces aggregate division AF(pˆi, P−i) with AF(pˆi, P−i)j =
med(F (tˆ∗), pˆi, j , P−i, j ) ≤ med(F (t∗), pˆi, j , P−i, j ) for all j , and∑j ∈[m](med(F (t∗), pˆi, j , P−i, j )−AF(P)j ) =∑
j ∈[m] yj . That is, the ℓ1 distance between taking generalized medians with phantoms defined by t∗
and doing so with phantoms defined by tˆ∗, conditioned on voter i reporting pˆi, is at most
∑
j ∈[m] yj .
Therefore, d(AF(pˆi, P−i), pi) ≥ d(AF(pi, P−i), pi) +∑j |yj | −∑j yj ≥ d(AF(pi, P−i). □
In addition to incentive compatibility, moving phantom mechanisms satisfy a natural monotonic-
ity property that says that if some voter increases her report on alternative j, and decreases her
report on all other alternatives, then the aggregate weight on alternative j should not decrease.
Definition 4.4. A budget aggregation mechanism A satisfies monotonicity if, for all pi, p′i with
pi, j > p
′
i, j for some j and pi,k ≤ p ′i,k for all k , j,
A(pi, P−i)j ≥ A(p′i , P−i)j .
Theorem 4.5. Every moving phantom mechanism satisfies monotonicity.
Proof. Let pi, p′i be such that pi, j > p ′i, j for some j and pi,k ≤ p ′i,k for all k , j . Let t∗ determine
the phantom placement for reports (pi, P−i) and t ′∗ for reports (p′i , P−i).
Suppose that t ′∗ < t∗. We have
A(p′i , P−i)j = med(F (t ′∗),p ′i, j , P−i, j ) ≤ med(F (t∗),pi, j , P−i, j ) = A(pi, P−i)j
where the inequality holds because pi, j > p ′i, j and fk (t∗) ≥ fk (t ′∗) for all k ∈ {0, . . . ,n}.
Next, suppose that t ′∗ > t∗. Then
A(p′i , P−i)j = 1 −
∑
k,j
A(p′i , P−i)k = 1 −
∑
j′,j
med(F (t ′∗),p ′i, j′, P−i, j′)
≤ 1 −
∑
j′,j
med(F (t∗),pi, j′, P−i, j′) = A(pi, P−i)j
where the inequality holds because pi, j′ < p ′i, j′ for all j ′ , j and fk (t∗) ≤ fk (t ′∗) for all k ∈
{0, . . . ,n}. □
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Before we move on to particular moving phantom mechanisms, let us end this section with a
tantalizing open question: Does there exist an (anonymous, neutral, continuous) incentive compati-
ble budget aggregation mechanism that is not a moving phantom mechanism? We have not been
able to construct any example, and have found that some mechanisms that on first sight seem to
have nothing to do with medians end up having an equivalent description as a moving phantom
mechanism. For the simpler two-alternative case, we already have a characterization of all incentive
compatible mechanisms (Theorem 3.1). This class can equivalently be described in terms of moving
phantoms, and so the answer to our question form = 2 is no.
Theorem 4.6. Form = 2, moving phantom mechanisms are the only budget aggregation mecha-
nisms that satisfy anonymity, neutrality, continuity, and incentive compatibility.
Proof. Certainly all moving phantom mechanisms satisfy these properties. For the other di-
rection, we know from Theorem 3.1 that any mechanism A satisfying these properties can
be described as a generalized median with phantoms α0, . . . ,αn satisfying, due to neutrality,
{α0, . . . ,αn} = {1−α0, . . . , 1−αn}. We show thatA is equivalent to a moving phantommechanism.
DefineAF using a phantom system F for which there exists a t∗ ∈ [0, 1]with fk (t∗) = αk for every
k ∈ {0, . . . ,n}. Then, for every preference profile P, we have that AF(P)1 = med(F (t∗), Pi ∈[n], j ) =
(α0, . . . ,αn , Pi ∈[n], j ), and AF(P)2 = 1 − AF(P)1, matching the output of A. □
5 THE INDEPENDENT MARKETS MECHANISM
We have seen that uniform phantoms is uniquely proportional form = 2. By a similar argument
to the proof of Proposition 3.2, it is easy to see that any family of functions F that generates
uniform phantoms at some snapshot will be proportional, and will reduce to the uniform phantom
mechanism form = 2. However, this leaves a large class of moving phantom mechanisms to choose
from. In this section, we identify a particular moving phantom mechanism that generalizes the
uniform phantom mechanism for arbitrarym. Its output can be interpreted as a market equilibrium.
Definition 5.1. The independent markets mechanism (AIM) is the moving phantom mechanism
defined by the phantom system fk (t) = min{t(n − k), 1} for each k ∈ {0, . . . ,n}.
To visualize the phantom placement, observe that for any t ≤ 1/n, phantoms are being placed at
0, t , 2t , . . . ,nt . Once t reaches 1/n, phantoms continue to grow in the same manner, but the higher
phantoms get capped at 1.2 This is actually the mechanism that we displayed in Figure 1. Note
that, when t = 1/n, the phantom placement is uniform on [0, 1] (as is the case in the third panel of
Figure 1); thus, AIM reduces to the uniform phantom mechanism form = 2.
Example 5.2. Let us consider a simple numerical example. Let n = m = 3, and suppose voter
reports are p1 = (0, 0.5, 0.5), p2 = (0.5, 0.5, 0), and p3 = (0.9, 0, 0.1). Consider the placement of the
n + 1 = 4 phantoms when t = 0.6. They are placed at f0(t) = 0.6, f1(t) = 0.4, f2(t) = 0.2, f3(t) = 0.
On the first alternative,
med{ f0(t), f1(t), f2(t), f3(t),p1,1,p2,1,p3,1} = med{0.6, 0.4, 0.2, 0, 0, 0.5, 0.9} = 0.4.
Similarly, it is easy to check that the generalized median on the second alternative is 0.4 and on
the third alternative is 0.2. Because these are normalized, t∗ = 0.6 is a valid choice of t∗, and the
outcome AIM(P) = (0.4, 0.4, 0.2).
2As written, fn (1) = 0, but Definition 4.1 requires fk (1) = 1 for all k . This detail does not matter here, since normalization
is always achieved without moving phantom n, but one could write fn in a different form to satisfy Definition 4.1 without
it changing the behavior of the mechanism.
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5.1 Market Interpretation
Why do we call this mechanism the independent markets mechanism? To explain this, we first
establish a connection between the market clearing price in a simple single-good market and the
median of some familiar-looking numbers.
Suppose we are selling a single divisible good, of which a total amount of x ∈ [0,∞) is available.
Each of n voters has a budget of 1, and a value vi ∈ [0,∞) per unit of the good. At a price π ≥ 0
per unit of the good, the demand of voter i , Di (π ) is given by the following function:
Di (π ) =

∞ π = 0,
1
π 0 < π < vi ,
0 π ≥ vi and π > 0.
Thus, each voter demands as much of the good as their budget of 1 allows at price π , as long as the
price per unit is lower than their value per unit. The market clearing price c is the price at which
the supply of the good (x ) equals the total demand. Formally,
c = sup{π : ∑i ∈[n] Di (π ) > x}, (2)
where the supremum is necessary because, due to discontinuities in the demand function, supply
and demand may never be exactly equal.
It turns out that the market clearing price c is equal to the median of the n voter values vi and
the n + 1 “phantom values” which are uniformly distributed on the interval [0,n/x]. To the best of
our knowledge, this connection has not previously been appreciated in the literature.
Lemma 5.3. In the market defined above, the market clearing price c equals
med(0, 1/x , . . . , (n − 1)/x ,n/x ,v1, . . . ,vn).
Proof. We distinguish the cases that the median is a phantom entry or a voter entry. Suppose
that the median is a/x for some a. Then we can partition the (real and phantom) entries, with the
exception of the phantom at a/x , into sets A and B with |A| = |B | = n, where A consists only of
entries less than or equal to a/x , and B consists only of entries greater than or equal to a/x .
The set B contains n − a phantoms, so n − (n − a) = a voter reports. At any price π < a/x ,
each voter i ∈ B has demand Di (π ) = 1/π > x/a. The total demand of all voters in B is therefore
greater than x . At price π = a/x , each voter i ∈ B has demand Di (π ) = 1/π = x/a (if vi > a/x ) or
Di (π ) = 0 (if vi = a/x ), and each voter i < B has demand 0. Therefore the total demand of all voters
is at most x , so the market clearing price is a/x .
Next, suppose that the generalized median is a/x < y < (a + 1)/x for some a ≤ n − 1 (note that
the generalized median cannot be greater than n/x , because it cannot be higher than the largest
phantom value). Then we can partition the (real and phantom) entries, not including a single voter
with vi = y (one such voter must exist because the median coincides with some entry, and no
phantom entry lies at y), into sets A and B each of size n, where A consists only of entries less than
or equal to y, and B consists only of entries greater than or equal to y.
Again, B contains n − a phantom reports, so a voter reports. At all prices π < y, each of these a
voters, as well as voter i with πi = y, has demand 1/π > 1/y. The total demand is thus greater than
(a + 1)/y > x . At price π = y, the total demand is at most a/y < x (since the number of voters with
vi > y is at most the number voter reports in set B). The market clearing price is therefore y. □
The “market” connection to independent markets is now clear: For each alternative j, we set up
a market in which we sell an amount x of a good; this amount is the same across markets. Voter
i ∈ [n] has value pˆi, j for the good sold in market j, and has a budget of 1 in each market. The
markets are “independent” because, while each voter is engaged in every market, the budget of
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1 for each market can only be used to buy the good sold in that market. Using Lemma 5.3, we
can derive the market clearing prices in each of these markets. If we write t = n/x , then these
prices correspond exactly to the output of AIM with the phantoms as placed at time t . Changing
the phantom placement by varying t to normalize the output is equivalent to varying the amount
x of the good sold in each market until the clearing prices across markets sum to 1. While we
prevent phantoms from moving above 1 in the definition of independent markets—complying
with Definition 4.1—the exact positions of these phantoms do not affect the clearing price since all
reports are at most 1.
Returning to Example 5.2, we can verify the outcome using the market interpretation, by setting
the quantity of goods to be sold in each market to x∗ = n/t∗ = 5. In the market corresponding to
alternative 1, the market clears at price π1 = 0.4, at which price voters 2 and 3 demand 1/π1 = 2.5
goods each, matching supply, and voter 1 demands nothing as p1,1 = 0 < π . It can be checked that
the market prices also match the independent markets outcome for alternatives 2 and 3.
The market system we have described yields an incentive-compatible aggregator, since it corre-
sponds to a moving phantom mechanism. There are other market-based aggregation mechanisms
described in the literature, most famously the parimutuel consensus mechanism of Eisenberg and
Gale [15]. That mechanism differs from ours in that voters have only a single budget of 1 which
they can use in all of the markets. (The supply of goods can be fixed at x = n, which guarantees
that prices are normalized, because total spending is fixed.) For the casem = 2, it does not matter
whether markets are independent or not, and our mechanism is equivalent to the one of Eisenberg
and Gale [15]. It follows that the parimutuel consensus mechanism is incentive compatible for
m = 2 (in our ℓ1 sense). However, form ≥ 3, the mechanism is manipulable,3 and hence cannot
be represented as a moving phantom mechanism. We point the reader to the work of Garg et al.
[18] for a detailed overview of other settings in which market mechanisms have been used in the
context of public decision making.
5.2 Voting Game Interpretation
We have seen descriptions of AIM as a moving phantom mechanism and as clearing prices of a
market system. We next give a game-theoretic description: the independent markets mechanism
can be seen as the unique Nash equilibrium outcome of a voting game inspired by range voting [31].
The game works as follows. Each voter receives one “credit” per alternative, and chooses how
much of that credit to place on the alternative. That is, each voter chooses a vector si ∈ [0, 1]m .
The outcome of the game is the division p where pj is proportional to
∑
i ∈[n] si, j , the amount of
credits spent on alternative j. Voters choose their spending so as to obtain an outcome that is as
close to their ideal point pˆi as possible, according to ℓ1 distance.
Theorem 5.4. The voting game defined above has a unique outcome p that can be obtained in Nash
equilibrium, and it is equal to the output of the Independent Markets mechanism.
The idea of the proof is to set si, j equal to the amount that agent i spends in the market for
alternative j, under the market setup that we described earlier. We show that when every agent
casts “vote” si, the system is at (its unique) equilibrium, and that the spending is proportional to
the independent markets outcome.
Proof. Let s−i denote the spending profile of all voters other than i , and let q denote the aggregate
division in which the weight on an alternative is proportional to the number of credits spent on that
alternative. Suppose that si is a best response for voter i . We first show that for every alternative j,
3Let p1 = (0, 0.5, 0.5), p2 = (0.5, 0.5, 0). Parimutuel consensus yields prices (1/3, 1/3, 1/3), at distance 2/3 from p1. If voter
1 instead reports pˆ1 = (0, 0, 1), the price vector is (0.25, 0.25, 0.5), at distance 0.5 from p1.
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qj < pi, j implies si, j = 1 and qj > pi, j implies si, j = 0. That is, voters will always prefer to increase
their spending on alternatives that they consider “undervalued”, and decrease their spending on
“overvalued” alternatives.
To prove this, suppose that qj < pi, j and si, j < 1. Since q and pi are both normalized, there
must exist some alternative j ′ for which qj′ > pi, j′ . By marginally increasing si, j while holding si, j˜
constant for all j˜ , j , voter i can move the aggregate division from q to q′, where q′j = qj + ϵ < pi, j ,
and q′
j˜
= q j˜ − ϵ j˜ for all j˜ , j, with
∑
j˜,j ϵ j˜ = ϵ and q′j′ > pi, j′ .
We can now show that d(q, pi) > d(q′, pi), which implies that si is not a best response for i .
d(q, pi) − d(q′, pi) = |qj − pi, j | − |q′j − pi, j | + |qj′ − pi, j′ | − |q′j′ − pi, j′ | +
∑
j˜,j, j′
(|q j˜ − pi, j˜ | − |q′j˜ − pi, j˜ |)
≥ ϵ + ϵj′ −
∑
j˜,j, j′
ϵ j˜ = 2ϵj′ > 0
Next, we show that there exists an equilibrium of the voting game that produces the same outcome
as independent markets. To this end, consider the market interpretation. For every alternative, some
amount x∗ = n/t∗ of a divisible good is sold to voters with a budget of 1 credit each. The number
of credits that each voter spends in each market defines some spending profile s.4 Importantly,
wheneverpi, j > AIM(P)j , voter i spends their full budget on alternative j (i.e. si, j = 1), and whenever
pi, j < AIM(P)j , voter i spends nothing on alternative j (i.e. si, j = 0). Further, the amount spent on
each alternative is x∗ · AIM(P)j – the amount of goods sold multiplied by the price per unit – which
is proportional to the aggregate division, AIM(P). Therefore, the induced spending profile does
produce the same aggregate division as independent markets when aggregated under the rules of
the voting game. It remains to show that this spending profile is an equilibrium.
To do so, consider the spending vector si of some voter i , and suppose they have a better response
s′i . Denote the aggregate division when i spends si by q (this division is AIM(P), but we use q for
short), and the aggregate division when i spends s′i by q′. There must exist either some alternative
j with qj < pi, j for which qj < q′j , and/or with qj > pi, j for which qj > q′j . Suppose without loss of
generality that the former case holds (if instead only the latter case holds, a very similar argument
applies). Because qj < pi, j , we know that si, j = 1. Therefore, the only way for
qj =
si, j +
∑
i′,i si′, j∑
j′ si, j′ +
∑
i′,i
∑
j′ si′, j′
<
s ′i, j +
∑
i′,i si′, j∑
j′ s
′
i, j′ +
∑
i′,i
∑
j′ si′, j′
= q′j
is for
∑
j′ si, j′ >
∑
j′ s
′
i, j′ . But, because si, j′ = 0 for all j ′ with qj′ > pi, j′ , the reduction in i’s spending
must come from alternatives with qj′ ≤ pi, j′ . That is, qj′ ≤ pi, j′ for all alternatives with q′j′ < qj′ .
Therefore
d(q, pi) − d(q′, pi) =
∑
q′j′<qj′
(|qj′ − pi, j′ | − |q′j′ − pi, j′ |) +
∑
q′j′ ≥qj′
(|qj′ − pi, j′ | − |q′j′ − pi, j′ |)
=
∑
q′j′<qj′
(q′j′ − qj′) +
∑
q′j′ ≥qj′
(|qj′ − pi, j′ | − |q′j′ − pi, j′ |)
≤
∑
q′j′<qj′
(q′j′ − qj′) +
∑
q′j′ ≥qj′
(q′j′ − qj′) = 0
which contradicts that s′i is a better response than si for voter i .
4This spending profile is not unique, since for voters with pi, j equal to the clearing price for alternative j , there is some
flexibility as to which voters pay for and get assigned goods, and which do not.
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Next we show that the voting game has a unique equilibrium aggregate division.5 We know that
the independent markets aggregate q is an equilibrium with spending profile s. For contradiction,
suppose that there is some other equilibrium aggregate q′ with spending profile s′. Then there is
an alternative j for which q′j > qj and an alternative j ′ for which q′j′ < qj′ . Thus, there are weakly
fewer voters with pi, j ≥ q′j than with pi, j > qj . Because only voters with pi, j ≥ q′j can have s ′i, j > 0,
and all voters with pi, j > qj have si, j = 1, we know that
∑
i si, j >
∑
i s
′
i, j . But, because q′j > qj ,
global spending across all alternatives must be lower under s′ than under s;
∑
i
∑
j˜ si, j˜ >
∑
i
∑
j˜ s
′
i, j˜
.
By an identical argument,
∑
i si, j′ <
∑
i s
′
i, j′ , implying that
∑
i
∑
j˜ si, j˜ <
∑
i
∑
j˜ s
′
i, j˜
, contradicting the
previous sentence. Hence, the equilibrium aggregate division q = AIM(P) is unique. □
To illustrate the voting game interpretation, consider again Example 5.2. Define spending vectors
s1 = (0, 1, 1), s2 = (1, 1, 0), s3 = (1, 0, 0). These vectors sum to (2, 2, 1), which is proportional to
AIM(P) = (0.4, 0.4, 0.2). It can be checked that no voter wishes to unilaterally change their spending
vector. For example, if voter 1 increases the amount she spends on alternative 1, she will increase
the first coordinate of the outcome while decreasing the second and third coordinates, all of which
increase the distance between the outcome and her preferred budget.
5.3 Other Properties of Independent Markets
Under the voting game interpretation, it is easy to see that independent markets satisfies propor-
tionality. When voters are single-minded, it is a dominant strategy for them to spend their entire
budget on alternatives they favor and spend nothing on all other alternatives. The amount spent
on each alternative is therefore nj , where nj is the number of voters that favor alternative j.
Proposition 5.5. AIM satisfies proportionality.
Independent markets satisfies several other desirable properties. One of these is participation,
which says that voters should always prefer (truthfully) participating to not contributing a report.
Definition 5.6. A budget aggregation mechanism A satisfies participation if, for all pi and all
preference profiles P−i , d(A(pi, P−i), pi) ≤ d(A(P−i), pi).
Theorem 5.7. AIM satisfies participation.
Proof. UnderAIM, adding new a voter who agrees with the aggregate division does not change
the aggregate:AIM(AIM(P−i), P−i) = AIM(P−i). This can be seen by noting that for the new voters, it
is an equilibrium spending strategy to spend nothing, thus not changing the spending profile. Then
by incentive compatibility, d(AIM(pi, P−i), pi) ≤ d(AIM(AIM(P−i), P−i), pi) = d(AIM(P−i), pi). □
Another desirable property is reinforcement, which states that the aggregate division should
not change when two preference profiles that each agree with that aggregate are combined. For
P = (pˆ1, pˆ2, . . . , pˆnP ) and Q = (qˆ1, qˆ2, . . . , qˆnQ ), let P ∪ Q = (pˆ1, . . . , pˆnP , qˆ1, . . . , qˆnQ ).
Definition 5.8. A budget aggregation mechanism A satisfies reinforcement if, for all preference
profiles P and R with A(P) = A(R), it holds that A(P ∪ R) = A(P) = A(R).
Theorem 5.9. Independent markets satisfies reinforcement.
Proof. Let P and R be profiles with AIM(P) = AIM(R) = q. We utilize the market interpretation
of independent markets. Suppose that for profile P, market prices are normalized when x∗P goods
5In contrast, the exact spending profile is clearly not unique. For instance, in an instance with only a single voter, that voter
can enforce their belief exactly as long as they spend on each outcome in proportion to their belief, with no restriction on
the magnitude of their spending.
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are sold and for profile R, market prices are normalized when x∗R goods are sold. Now consider
the combined profile P ∪ R when x∗P + x∗R goods are sold. For every alternative j, and every price
π ∈ [0, 1], the total demand is equal to the total demand in profile P at price π plus the total demand
in profile R at price π , since a voter’s demand depends only on their valuation and the price π .
Likewise, the total supply is, by definition, the sum of the supplies in each individual instance.
Therefore, the market clearing prices in the combined instance when x∗P + x
∗
R goods are sold are
equal to the (normalized) aggregate vector q. □
We next check that the independent markets outcome is always rational and can be described in
polynomially many bits, thus ensuring that it can be computed efficiently as suggested in Section 4.
Our argument proceeds by showing that the outcome is a solution of a linear program, similar to a
proof of rationality for the parimutuel consensus mechanism [32, Thm. 5.1]. Consider the outcome
p of the independent markets, and write Nj = {i ∈ N : pj < pˆi, j } for the set of voters that purchase
good j ∈ [m] since their value is lower than its price. Now, if x is the supply of each good, then the
amount xpj of money spent on j equals the budget of the demanders, which is |Nj |. Introducing a
variable z ≡ 1/x , we can write this as pj = z · |Nj |. Thus, p is the solution of maximizing ϵ subject
to
pˆi, j ≤ pj − ϵ for j ∈ [m] and i ∈ Nj ,
pˆi, j ≥ pj for j ∈ [m] and i ∈ N \ Nj ,
pj = z · |Nj | for j ∈ [m],∑
j ∈[m] pj = 1, pj ≥ 0, z ≥ 0 for j ∈ [m].
Using standard encoding techniques, one can also calculate the independent markets mechanism
using an ILP with binary variables encoding “i ∈ Nj .”
6 PARETO OPTIMALITY AND SOCIAL WELFARE
The independent markets mechanism has several natural interpretations, and it satisfies pro-
portionality. However, it is not Pareto-optimal. If voter 1 reports (0.8, 0.2, 0) and voter 2 reports
(0.8, 0, 0.2), then independent markets returns (0.6, 0.2, 0.2), which is dominated by (0.8, 0.1, 0.1).
On this example, independent markets even fails to be range-respecting, which requires that
mini ∈[n] pˆi, j ≤ A(P)j ≤ maxi ∈[n] pˆi, j for all j ∈ [m].
The failure to be range-respecting can be fixed, if desired, by changing the positions of phantoms
0 and n. One can show that a moving phantom mechanism AF is range-respecting if and only if
f0(t) = 1 and fn(t) = 0 for all t ∈ [0, 1] except for an initial period where phantom 0 moves from 0
to 1 while all other phantoms remain at 0, and a period at the end where phantom n moves from 0
to 1 while all other phantoms are at 1. This mirrors a result in Section 3; if the outer two phantoms
are at 0 and 1, the n − 1 remaining phantoms cannot outweigh the n voter reports.
While many moving phantom mechanisms are range-respecting, it is much more difficult to
find a mechanism in this class which is Pareto-optimal. Usually, it is possible to construct a profile
in which the mechanism returns a vector p all of whose entries are phantom reports, and then a
Pareto improvement can be obtained by perturbing this vector in the directions where the majority
of voter reports lie. Such a perturbation is not possible if the phantoms lie at 0 or 1, which turns
out to be the only escape. As we prove below, no mechanism AF can be Pareto-optimal if there is
any time point t when two phantoms are both strictly between 0 and 1.
This condition is extremely restrictive, and a moment’s thought reveals that there is only one
legal phantom system which avoids having two interior phantoms: All phantoms start at 0, and
then, one by one, one of the phantoms is moved to 1. At each t , at most one phantom lies strictly
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between 0 and 1 while travelling. We call this phantom system F ∗. It can be formalized as
fk (t) =

0 0 ≤ t ≤ kn+1 ,
t(n + 1) − k kn+1 < t < k+1n+1 ,
1 k+1n+1 ≤ t ≤ 1.
Below we will show that AF∗ precisely corresponds to the budget aggregation mechanism
that maximizes voter welfare, breaking ties in favor of the maximum entropy division. It will
immediately follow that AF∗ is indeed Pareto-optimal. Combined with Theorem 6.1 below, which
shows that all other moving phantom mechanisms are Pareto-inefficient, this implies that the
welfare-maximizing mechanism is the unique Pareto-optimal moving phantom mechanism.
6.1 Characterizing Pareto Optimality
The proof of Theorem 6.1 shows, by induction, that each phantom needs to move all the way to 1
before the next phantom can leave its position at 0. In case this does not happen, based on the
approximate phantom positions, we construct a profile where the mechanism is Pareto-inefficient.
These constructions are of two kinds: an easier case when the interior phantoms are low (lying
below 1n(n−1) ), and a more involved case when one of the phantoms has moved higher. In both
cases, our constructions utilize two types of alternatives. More voters report “high” probabilities on
alternatives of the first type than on alternatives of the second type. The constructions work so
that if two phantoms simultaneously take values between 0 and 1, then the mechanism outputs
middling values on all alternatives. Social welfare can be improved by increasing the output on
alternatives of the first type, and decreasing the output on alternatives of the second type. By
incorporating enough symmetry between voters, we guarantee that social welfare gains are shared
equally, so obtain a Pareto improvement.
Theorem 6.1. A moving phantom mechanismAF cannot be Pareto-optimal for anym ≥ n2 unless
AF = AF∗ .
Proof. We first show that any Pareto optimal moving phantom mechanism AF for which
there exists a t with f0(t) < 1 and f1(t) > 0 can be equivalently expressed as a moving phantom
mechanism that does not have such a t . Suppose thatAF = med(f0(t∗), . . . , fn(t∗), pˆ1, j , . . . , pˆn, j ) =
f0(t∗) < p¯1, j for some j. Then AF is not Pareto optimal, because increasing AF(P)j and de-
creasing AF(P)j′ for any coordinate with AF(P)j′ > p¯1, j′ is a Pareto improvement (such a
coordinate must exist, because
∑
j p¯1, j ≤ 1). Therefore, for all preference profiles P, AF =
med(f0(t∗), . . . , fn(t∗), pˆ1, j , . . . , pˆn, j ) ≥ p¯1, j . This implies that f0(t∗) ≥ p¯1, j and so the exact po-
sition of f0(t∗) has no effect on the mechanism. It would be equivalent to move phantom f0 to
position 1 before moving phantom f1.
A very similar argument can be used to show that there cannot exist a t for which fn−1(t) < 1
and fn(t) > 0. For the rest of the proof, we focus on the intermediate phantoms. Suppose that there
exists some index 1 ≤ k ≤ n − 2 for which fk (t) < 1 and fk+1(t) > 0 for some t . If no such k exists,
then phantom system F = F ∗.
We next show that if fk (t) < 1n(n−1) , it must be the case that xk+1(t) = 0. Define an instance with
m = n2 alternatives. Voter i ∈ [n] reports pˆi, j = 1n2−kn−1 for alternatives j ∈ {((i−1)(n−1)+1, . . . , (i−
1)(n − 1)+n2 −n −kn +k) mod n(n − 1)} and for alternatives j ∈ {n(n − 1)+ (i, i + 1, i +n −k − 2)
mod n}, and pˆi, j = 0 for all other alternatives. Note that ∑mj=1 pˆi, j = 1. Further, note that among
alternatives 1, ...,n(n − 1), each voter makes n2 − n − kn + k = (n − 1)(n − k) non-zero reports and
each alternative has n−k non-zero reports, while among alternatives n(n−1)+1, . . . ,n2, each voter
makes n − k − 1 non-zero reports and each alternative has n − k − 1 non-zero reports. Therefore, if
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fk (t) < 1n2−kn−1 , the generalized median on alternative j is fk (t) for j ∈ {1, . . . ,n(n − 1)} and the
median on alternative j is fk+1(t) for j ∈ {n + 1, . . . , 2n}.
Suppose that there exists t for which fk (t) < 1n(n−1) < 1n2−kn−1 and fk+1(t) > 0. Then, since f is
increasing and continuous, and the aggregate division AF(P) is normalized, it will necessarily be
the case that for all j ∈ {1, ...,n(n − 1)}, Af (P)j = fk (t∗) < 1n(n−1) , and for all j ∈ {1, ...,n(n − 1)},
Af (P)j = fk+1(t∗) > 0, with n(n − 1)fk (t∗)+nfk+1(t∗) = 1. But this is not Pareto optimal. Consider,
for some small enough ϵ , increasingAF(P)j by ϵ on alternatives j ∈ {1, . . . ,n(n−1)}, and decreasing
AF(P)j by ϵ(n−1) on alternatives j ∈ {n(n−1)+1, . . . ,n2}. For every voter i , there aren2−n−kn+k
alternatives on which the aggregate moves ϵ closer to i’s report, kn − k alternatives for which the
aggregate moves ϵ farther from i’s report, n − k − 1 alternatives on which the aggregate moves
ϵ(n − 1) further from i’s report, and k + 1 alternatives for which the aggregate moves ϵ(n − 1) closer
to i’s report. Summing these up, the change moves the aggregate (2n− 2)ϵ closer to pˆi in ℓ1 distance.
We now show that if fk (t) < 1 then it must be the case that fk+1(t) = 0. For contradiction suppose
otherwise. Let t¯ = sup{t : fk+1(t) = 0} be the final snapshot at which fk+1(t) = 0. By assumption,
fk (t¯) < 1. We define an instance similar to that above. Let δ > 0 (we will determine the exact value
of δ later). For every voter i , let pˆi, j = 1−fk (t¯ )−δn(n−1)−1 for every j ∈ {(i−1)(n−1)+1, . . . , (i−1)(n−1)+n−1}
and pˆi, j = 1−fk (t¯ )n(n−1)−1 for every j ∈ {((i−1)(n−1)+n, . . . , (i−1)(n−1)+n2−n−kn+k) mod n(n−1)}.
However, for j = 1, for every voter i with pi,1 = 1−fk (t¯ )−δn(n−1)−1 we instead set pi,1 = fk (t¯) + δ , overriding
the earlier setting. Because we know that fk (t¯) ≥ 1n(n−1) , we have that 1−fk (t¯ )−δn(n−1)−1 <
1− 1n(n−1)
n(n−1)−1 ≤
1
n(n−1) ≤ xk , therefore the new value of pˆi,1 is higher than the one it replaces. To set δ , choose
some value that guarantees
∑n(n−1)
j=1 pˆi, j < 1 for all i . In particular, by the previous observation, it is
sufficient to set δ so that
fk (t¯) + δ + (n − 2) 1−fk (t¯ )−δn(n−1)−1 + (n − k − 1)(n − 1) 1−fk (t¯ )n(n−1)−1 < 1. (3)
To see that such a value of δ exists, note that Equation 3 is continuous in δ and takes value strictly
less than 1 when δ = 0:
fk (t¯) + (n − 2) 1−fk (t¯ )n(n−1)−1 + (n − k − 1)(n − 1) 1−fk (t¯ )n(n−1)−1 < fk (t¯) + n(n − 2) 1−fk (t¯ )n(n−1)−1
< fk (t¯) + 1 − fk (t¯) = 1,
where we may assume n ≥ 3 because the case of n = 2 has only a single phantom that is not f0 or
fn . For every j ∈ {1, . . . ,n(n − 1)} for which pˆi, j is not explicitly set greater than 0, we set it to 0.
For all i , we evenly distribute the remaining (positive) mass 1 − ∑n(n−1)j=1 pi, j evenly among
j ∈ {n(n − 1) + (i, i + 1, i + n − k − 2) mod n}.
When t = t¯ , the generalized median on each alternative is fk (t) = fk (t¯) for alternative 1,
1−fk (t¯ )−δ
n(n−1)−1 for all j ∈ {2, . . . ,n(n − 1), and xk+1(t¯) = 0 for all j ∈ {n(n − 1) + 1, . . . ,n2}. The sum
of these generalized medians is 1 − δ . Therefore t needs to increase to achieve normalization.
By the definition of t¯ , for any t > t¯ , we have that fk+1(t) > 0, and therefore the generalized
median on all alternatives j ∈ {n(n − 1) + 1, . . . ,n2} is greater than 0. It is therefore impossible
for fk (t) to reach fk (t¯) + δ , because then the sum of generalized medians would exceed 1. It is
also impossible for fk+1(t) to reach 1−fk (t¯ )n(n−1)−1 . If it does, then the generalized median on alternative
1 is at least fk (t¯), on j ∈ {2, . . . ,n(n − 1)} is 1−fk (t¯ )n(n−1)−1 and on j ∈ {n(n − 1) + 1, . . . ,n2} is strictly
greater than 0. Therefore the aggregate is not normalized. To summarize, we are guaranteed that
1
n(n−1) ≤ AF(P)1 < fk (t¯) + δ , 1−fk (t¯ )−δn(n−1)−1 ≤ AF(P)j < 1−fk (t¯ )n(n−1)−1 for all j ∈ {2, . . . ,n(n − 1)}, and
AF(P)j > 0 for all j ∈ {n(n + 1) + 1, . . . ,n2}.
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Fig. 2. Snapshots of the phantom system F ∗ with t < t∗ (left), t = t∗ (center), and t > t∗ (right) on an
instance with n = 5,m = 3.
Now we can define a Pareto improvement to AF(P) of the same form as previously. For some
small enough ϵ , increase the aggregate by ϵ on alternatives j ∈ {1, . . . ,n(n − 1)}, and decrease the
aggregate by ϵ(n− 1) on alternatives j ∈ {n(n− 1)+ 1, . . . ,n2}. For voter 1, with p1,1 = fk (t¯)+δ , the
new aggregate is ϵ better than AF(P) on alternative 1, ϵ worse on alternatives j ∈ {2, . . . ,n − 1},
with p1, j = 1−fk (t¯ )−δn(n−1)−1 , ϵ better on alternatives j ∈ {n, . . . ,n2 −n−kn+k}, with pi, j = 1−fk (t¯ )n(n−1)−1 , and ϵ
worse on alternatives j ∈ {n2−n−kn+k +1, . . . ,n(n−1)}, with pi, j = 0. On the final n alternatives,
there are at least k + 1 alternatives on which the aggregate moves ϵ(n − 1) closer to voter 1’s report
(on alternatives for which voter 1 reports pi, j = 0), and at most n − k − 1 alternatives for which the
aggregate moves ϵ(n− 1) farther from voter 1’s report. Summing these up, we get the aggregate has
moved 1 − (n − 2) + (n − k − 1)(n − 1) − k(n − 1) − (n − 1)(n − k − 1) + (n − 1)(k + 1) = 2 towards p1.
For all other voters, the new aggregate is ϵ worse than AF(P) on alternatives j ∈ {(i − 1)(n −
1) + 1, . . . ,n − 1}, with pi, j = 1−fk (t¯ )−δn(n−1)−1 , and ϵ better on alternatives j ∈ {((i − 1)(n − 1) +n, . . . , (i −
1)(n − 1) + n2 − n − kn + k) mod n(n − 1)}, with pi, j = 1−fk (t¯ )n(n−1)−1 , and ϵ worse on alternatives
j ∈ {((i −1)(n−1)+n2−n−kn+k +1, . . . , (i −1)(n−1)+n(n−1)) mod n(n−1)}, with pi, j = 0. On
the final n alternatives, there are at least k + 1 alternatives on which the aggregate moves ϵ(n − 1)
closer to voter i’s report (on alternatives for which voter i reports pi, j = 0), and at most n − k − 1
alternatives for which the aggregate moves ϵ(n − 1) farther from voter i’s report. Summing these
up, we get that the new and old aggregates are equal ℓ1 distances from pi.
Finally, our construction usesm = n2 alternatives, but we can extend it to largerm by adding
dummy alternatives that no voter puts any weight on. □
On profiles consisting of single-minded voters, AF∗ selects a division that is also single-minded,
following the plurality. Hence, it is not proportional, which gives the following corollary.
Corollary 6.2. Form ≥ n2, no moving phantom mechanism is proportional and Pareto-optimal.
6.2 Maximizing Social Welfare
Having narrowed down the space of Pareto-optimal moving phantom mechanisms to at most one
mechanism, let us examine the behavior ofAF∗ with the assistance of Figure 2, which takes the same
form as Figure 1. On every alternative, order the entries {pi, j } from largest to smallest. We denote
the relabeled entries p¯1, j ≥ . . . ≥ p¯n, j . At the snapshot of F ∗ for which f0(t) = . . . = fk (t) = 1
and fk+1(t) = . . . = fn(t) = 0, the generalized median selects the order statistic p¯n−k, j for all j. We
see this in Figure 2 where, in the left image, k = 2 and the generalized median is the n − k = 3rd
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highest report on each alternative, and in the right image k = 3 and the n −k = 2nd highest reports
are chosen.
We can think of F ∗ as partitioning the phantom “movie” into periods defined by which phantom
is moving. Initially, all phantoms are at 0, and the generalized medians are 0 for each j ∈ [m]. Then
phantom f0 moves to 1, and the generalized medians are p¯n, j . As phantom fk moves from 0 to
1, the generalized medians progress from p¯n−k+1, j to p¯n−k, j , until all phantoms reach 1 and the
generalized medians are uniformly 1. By (a discrete analogue of) the intermediate value theorem,
there must exist some value I for which
∑
j ∈[m] p¯I+1, j ≤ 1 and
∑
j ∈[m] p¯I, j ≥ 1, and this transition
is made during the period in which phantom n − I is moving. In Figure 2, we have I = 2 because
the sum of the third-highest entries is less than one (see the left image), while the sum of the
second-highest entries is more than one (the right image).
Normalization therefore occurs during the movement of phantom fn−I , and the final value
AF∗ (P)j lies in the interval [p¯I+1, j , p¯I, j ]. If fn−I (t∗) lies in this interval, then AF∗ (P)j = fn−I (t∗),
otherwise AF∗ (P)j is equal to the endpoint of the interval closest to fn−I (t∗). This is depicted in
the center image of Figure 2, where f3(t∗) lies between the second and third-highest reports on the
first two alternatives, but below the third-highest report on the third alternative.
Finding the exact value of fn−I (t∗), and therefore the outputAF∗ (P), can be thought of as finding
the “most equal” division, subject to interval constraints on each alternative. This problem has been
studied before, and the (unique) value of fn−I (t∗) can be found in O(m logm) time by the Divvy
algorithm of Gulati et al. [22].
Given a profile P, the social cost of an outcome p is
∑
i ∈[n] d(pˆi , p), and the (utilitarian) social
welfare of p is the negation of the social cost. In general, there may be multiple divisions that
maximize social welfare. For example, ifm = 2, one voter reports (1, 0) and another reports (0, 1),
then all divisions have the same social cost of 2. As it turns out, any division that satisfies the upper
and lower bound constraints of p¯I, j and p¯I+1, j maximizes social welfare.
Lemma 6.3. A division q maximizes social welfare if and only if p¯I+1, j ≤ qj ≤ p¯I, j for all j.
Proof. Let q be a division with p¯I+1, j ≤ qj = p¯I+1, j + ϵj ≤ p¯I, j for all j, with normalization of q
implying that
∑
j ∈[m] ϵj = 1 −
∑
j ∈[m] p¯I+1, j . Then the social cost of q is∑
j ∈[m]
∑
i ∈[n]
|p¯i, j − qj | =
∑
j ∈[m]
©­«
∑
i ∈[n]
|p¯i, j − p¯I+1, j | +
∑
i≥I+1
ϵj −
∑
i≤I
ϵj
ª®¬
=
∑
j ∈[m]
∑
i ∈[n]
|p¯i, j − p¯I+1, j | + (n − 2I ) ©­«1 −
∑
j ∈[m]
p¯I+1, j
ª®¬
Because this expression does not depend on ϵj , all such divisions q have the same social cost.
We now show that this distance is minimal. Let q be a division that does not satisfy p¯I+1, j ≤
qj ≤ p¯I, j for some j. Suppose qj > p¯I, j (the case where qj < p¯I+1, j can be handled similarly). By
the definition of I , there must exist some alternative j ′ for which qj′ < p¯I, j′ . Now, consider the
division q′ defined by q′j = qj − ϵ > p¯I, j and q′j′ = qj′ + ϵ < p¯I, j′ , with q′ and q equal on all other
coordinates. Compare q and q′ in terms of ℓ1 distance from the reports. They are indistinguishable
on all alternatives other than j and j ′. On alternative j, q′ is ϵ closer than q to all entries p¯i, j with
i ≥ I , and at most ϵ farther from all other entries. On alternative j ′, q′ is ϵ closer than q to all
entries p¯i, j′ with i ≤ I , and at most ϵ farther from all other entries. Therefore, of the 2n entries on
alternatives j and j ′, q′ is ϵ closer than q to at least n + 1 of them, and no more than ϵ farther than
q from the other n − 1. Therefore, q does not maximize social welfare. □
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As a corollary of Lemma 6.3, we immediately obtain that AF∗ maximizes social welfare, and is
therefore Pareto-optimal. Social welfare-maximizing mechanisms have been considered before;
all that is needed is a suitable tiebreaking procedure to select a single division from the set of
maximizers. Goel et al. [21] suggest breaking ties by selecting the lexicographically largest welfare
maximizer, but this is not neutral. We propose a different way to break ties, which is neutral:
select the welfare maximizer p with largest Shannon entropy −∑j ∈[m] pj logpj . Because the set of
welfare-maximizers is convex, and Shannon entropy is a convex function, existence and uniqueness
of p is guaranteed.
Theorem 6.4. For every profile P, AF∗ selects the entropy-maximizing division among those that
maximize social welfare.
Proof. From the earlier discussion, we know that AF∗ (P)j = med{p¯I+1, j , p¯I, j , fn−I (t∗)} ∈
[p¯I+1, j , p¯I, j ] for all j ∈ [m]. Therefore, it maximizes social welfare.
It remains to show that, subject to these constraints, AF∗ (P) maximizes Shannon entropy.
Consider any other division q , AF∗ (P) with p¯I+1, j ≤ qj ≤ p¯I, j . Then there must exist an
alternative j for which p¯I+1, j ≤ AF∗ (P)j < qj ≤ p¯I, j . Further, because AF∗ (P)j < p¯I, j , it must be
the case that fn−I (t∗) ≤ AF∗ (P)j = med{p¯I+1, j , p¯I, j , fn−I (t∗)}. There must also be an alternative j ′
for which p¯I+1, j′ ≤ qj′ < AF∗ (P)j′ ≤ p¯I, j′ , with AF∗ (P)j′ ≤ fn−I (t∗).
Putting these together, we have that qj′ < fn−I (t∗) < qj . We also know that p¯I+1, j < qj and
qj′ < p¯I, j′ . Therefore, adjusting qj to qj − ϵ and qj′ to qj′ + ϵ , for ϵ small enough that none of the
above strict inequalities are violated, both (1) decreases |qj −qj′ |, which it is easy to check increases
Shannon entropy, and (2) respects social-welfare maximization. Therefore, q is not the unique
entropy-maximizing division among social welfare maximizers, so AF∗ is. □
Similar to independent markets,AF∗ satisfies participation. The argument proceeds along exactly
the same lines. For an individual voter, participating and reporting the existing aggregate has no
effect, while reporting truthfully is at least as beneficial, by incentive compatibility.
Theorem 6.5. AF∗ satisfies participation.
The utilitarian mechanism also satisfies reinforcement, which follows from the additivity of
social welfare.
Theorem 6.6. AF∗ satisfies reinforcement.
Proof. Let P and R be profiles with AF∗ (P) = AF∗ (R) = q. Let q′ be some division with higher
entropy than q. Then it must be the case that d(q′, P) > d(q, P) and d(q′,R) > d(q,R). Since the ℓ1
distance is additive, d(q′, P ∪ R) > d(q, P ∪ R).
Now let q′ be some division with d(q′, P ∪ R) < d(q, P ∪ R). Then d(q′, P) + d(q′,R) < d(q, P) +
d(q,R). But this is impossible, since q maximizes social welfare for profiles P and R.
Therefore, any division q′ , q either has strictly lower social welfare on profile P ∪ R, or equal
social welfare but lower entropy. So AF∗ ((P ∪ R)) = q. □
7 CONCLUSION
We considered the problem of aggregating budget proposals for participatory budgeting. Inspired
by the generalized median mechanisms of Moulin [26], we introduced the broad class of moving
phantom mechanisms and proved that all mechanisms in this class are incentive compatible under
ℓ1 voter preferences. We analyzed two moving phantom mechanisms in detail: one that maximizes
social welfare while violating the natural fairness notion of proportionality, and another that
satisfies proportionality while violating Pareto optimality.
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In addition to the properties discussed in the main body of the paper, some other contrasts can be
drawn between these two mechanisms. For example, suppose that n is large, and n/2 voters report
(1, 0) while the other n/2 report (0, 1). Then, under AF∗ , a single voter can completely dictate the
outcome. Under independent markets, we can show that the ability of a single voter to affect the
outcome vanishes as n →∞.
We have implemented both mechanisms. Some preliminary simulation results suggest that even
when voters are not single-minded, independent markets is “more proportional” than AF∗ , in
the sense that it better reflects all voters’ opinions and not just that of the majority. However,
independent markets also has a tendency to shift the aggregate towards the uniform division,
relative to what we might otherwise expect. This deserves more investigation.
There are many other moving phantom mechanisms that we have not considered. It would be
interesting to investigate what other properties can be achieved by investigating other phantom
systems. And finally, as we mentioned earlier, when there are only two outcomes, we know that
all (anonymous, neutral, and continuous) incentive compatible budget aggregation mechanisms
can be represented as moving phantom mechanisms. It remains an open question whether this
continues to hold when the number of outcomesm is more than 2.
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